Similar complaints marked the campaign for elections to the second Constituent Assembly, held on 2 June 1946. The PCF’s political isolation was now noted openly by Pravda and illustrated with a claim that when the Interior Minister had ordered the removal of election posters from unauthorised sites, only the PCF’s posters had been taken down, leaving those of other parties, including the fiercely anti-communist Parti Républicain de la Liberté (PRL), intact.[374]Such practices were cited to explain the PCF’s descent into second place at the elections, with 25.9 per cent of the vote to the MRP’s 28.2. But Pravda also dwelt on losses by the Socialists (who fell back to 21.1 per cent), seen as resulting from ‘the anti-communism of the Socialist leadership’, which had ‘sown confusion among the party’s leaders and local organisations’. L’Humanité, it added, had underlined the ‘need for the union of workers and democratic forces in France against the reactionaries, who have not disarmed’.[375]
That summer’s events in France worried the Soviet press. The MRP used its electoral success to propose its leader Georges Bidault for the premiership. Izvestia saw the hand of Blum in the post-election manoeuvring, oddly claiming that he sought a single-party MRP government, able to ‘back the anti-communist campaign that certain political parties are currently leading’.[376]Commenting on the signs of anti-communism appearing within French society against the background of the developing Cold War, Pravda observed that on the day before the vote on the premiership, ‘a group of young Fascist sympathisers attacked the offices of the PCF Central Committee in Paris, looting the bookshop in the same building and burning its stock’, and added that ‘the police showed complete negligence’ in the matter.[377]
The Constituent Assembly voted Bidault into the premiership on 19 June 1946 by 384 votes. The 161 Communist Deputies abstained, neither welcoming Bidault as premier nor wishing to move into opposition. It was ‘a pity’, Duclos observed (and Pravda agreed), that France had foresworn the opportunity of ending the provisional regime by rejecting the first draft constitution, but the Communists, as good republicans, respected the people’s will. The new government could only be provisional. On the constitution, the PCF was open to concessions, except on two issues: the secular character of the state (a reference to the MRP’s Catholic loyalties) and the powers of the second chamber (a reference to the MRP’s intention to revive the Senate in some form).[378]
This relative self-restraint allowed the PCF to join the Bidault government, which was approved by an overwhelming majority in the Constituent Assembly on 26 June: Thorez and Gouin both became vice-premiers. But the government’s composition, with nine MRP ministers, seven Communists, six Socialists, one member of the UDSR and one with no party allegiance, reflected a weakening in the positions of the PCF and the SFIO, which now controlled only slightly over half the portfolios between them. Meanwhile de Gaulle had joined in the constitutional debate: his Bayeux speech of 16 June called for strong leadership at the top in what resembled a presidentialised republic. France’s anti-communist forces were now divided between Gaullists, main– stream conservatives, and the right wing of the MRP. Yet de Gaulle was always the PCF’s most formidable opponent; his return to the political scene inevitably gave the leadership pause for thought.
For the PCF, the two years since the liberation of Paris presented a mixed picture. Its membership and electorate had grown to levels unimaginable before 1939; ministerial office had won it respectability, plus the chance to place Communists in key administrative posts. But its wooing of the Socialists had been rebuffed; its claims to lead the government, however democratically legitimate, had been vetoed by the Socialists and the MRP; its preferred constitutional project – whose lack of checks and balances offered the best opportunity for any party that dominated the National Assembly to install itself durably in power – had been rejected by the voters; and the MRP had overtaken it (briefly, as it would turn out) at the ballot-box. Above all, perhaps, the ‘left-wing bloc’ was no nearer being achieved than in 1944. It was against this background of setbacks that the PCF received further advice from Moscow.
Within the ongoing contacts between the PCF and Moscow, the meeting of 19 June 1946 between Mikhail Suslov, a member of the CPSU’s Central Committee, and Benoît Frachon, joint secretary of the CGT and an unofficial member of the PCF’s Bureau politique, is especially important. Suslov sent a record of the conversation, marked ‘Top Secret’, to Molotov, stressing that Frachon had asked, in the name of the PCF leadership, for advice from the CPSU, though without raising any specific questions.[379]
Suslov’s record is chiefly remarkable for Frachon’s self-criticism over the PCF’s implementation of Stalin’s directives. The referendum campaign, he said, had seen a bitter struggle between the forces of ‘democracy’ and those of ‘reaction’, which had gone onto the offensive. But the PCF had run ahead of events, notably by demanding the premiership for Thorez. Intended to rally the largest possible number of Communist sympathisers, and ultimately to give ‘the masses’ a practical demonstration of Communist-led government, the slogan ‘Thorez au pouvoir’ ‘failed to take account of the fact that there are millions of Frenchmen who vote for the Communists but who don’t yet want them leading the government’. The PCF had also underestimated the forces of reaction, who, with the ‘profascist’ PRL at their head, had used ‘Thorez au pouvoir’ to play on hesitant voters’ fears. Although the Party had ‘taken a step back’ after the referendum, it had still faced an unprecedented anti-communist campaign at the June elections, led not only by the Right but by the Socialists, MRP and Radicals as well, which had left the PCF isolated. Even though Frachon talked of the PCF’s ‘victorious’ electoral campaign, his closing statement still leaves the impression that the Party was seeking to recognise its errors and its failure to heed Stalin’s warnings of November 1944. ‘Avoiding the isolation of the Party, holding on to positions gained, and surviving the difficulties of the current period’ were the bases of the PCF’s line. ‘Avoiding isolation’ meant seeking to extend the Party’s influence with the peasants, working with the petty bourgeoisie, continuing to work for the ‘unity of the working class’ (presumably a reference to competitive co-operation with the Socialists) and establishing relations with ‘democratic elements’ in the Radical Party and the MRP.
The PCF’s behaviour at the referendum of 12 October 1946 on the second (and definitive) draft Constitution corresponded to the strategy outlined by Frachon. The MRP, despite its former self-definition as the party of ‘fidelity’ to de Gaulle, sealed a lasting split with the General by refusing to back the strong presidential regime he had advocated at Bayeux. It was then obliged to reach an agreement with the Communists and Socialists. The second draft included the upper chamber the MRP had always wanted. But its powers (and the president’s) would be limited, and the state’s secular character would be guaranteed.[380]This compromise was backed by all three of the tripartite parties, and the PCF threw itself into the Yes campaign. On 7 October the Central Committee issued a text, reproduced in Pravda, calling on ‘all French patriots’ to ensure ‘the triumph of the Constitution of the French Republic’, against the ‘murky forces of reaction’ backed by ‘the trusts’ who opposed the restoration of republican principles in the Constitution now, as they had betrayed French democracy in the past. Pravda also, significantly, underlined the common ground between the PCF and the SFIO, reporting a speech by Vincent Auriol, the Socialist president of the Assembly, underlining the need to end the pro– visional regime and the dangers of a No vote.[381]
A similar theme – the PCF’s alignment with France’s ‘democratic forces’ against the ‘reactionaries’ who opposed the constitutional draft – is found in the treatment of de Gaulle during the campaign. Thus Pravda reported Thorez’s carefully-worded attack on the General, who, ‘whatever the respect owed him for past services to the country’, had now lined up with a ‘reactionary coalition’ including former supporters of the 1938 Munich agreements with Hitler, and of the Vichy regime.[382]After polling day, Pravda again underlined that by supporting a strong executive and warning of ‘disorder and anarchy’ if the constitution were approved, de Gaulle had provoked negative reactions not only from the PCF (which now branded him ‘the representative of the reactionary forces’) but also from former supporters in the MRP and in newspapers like Le Monde and Le Figaro.[383]
The referendum result, in which the constitution was approved by 53.5 per cent of those voting (or 36.2 per cent of the registered electorate) was hailed in Pravda as a ‘victory for democratic forces’ in France, and a ‘double defeat’ for ‘the reactionaries’. The ‘democratic forces’, the PCF chief among them, had first, at the price of significant concessions during the drafting, successfully defended articles defining the ‘republican and democratic’ nature of the regime, and had then prevailed in the ‘intense political struggle’ of the campaign. The three parties – PCF, SFIO, and MRP – that had backed the constitution now faced a further ‘fierce struggle’ at the parliamentary elections against the ‘reactionary camp’ – the PRL, the right wing of the Radicals, the UDSR, and the Union Gaulliste – which had opposed the text.
A ‘hard and important test’, requiring ‘the union of all the truly democratic forces of the country’, awaited France’s renascent democracy, especially as ‘outside influences’ were encouraging the reactionaries.[384]It would be hard to find a better exegesis of Stalin’s instructions to the PCF of two years earlier.
In the short term at least, the Party’s behaviour in the autumn 1946 appeared to pay off. It had played a significant role in drafting the constitution, with several clauses bearing its mark. And at the November 1946 elections it regained its leading position, winning a historical record score of 28.2 per cent. Yet the PCF had still not managed to implement the core of Stalin’s instructions – to unite the Left under its leadership, ready to move onto the offensive and take power in due course. Indeed, a final Thorez candidacy for the premiership failed – not, this time, because it was refused by the Socialist leadership, but only because the SFIO was unable to enforce voting discipline on its own Deputies, 23 of whom opposed the PCF leader. The PCF was again forced to fall in behind Socialist prime ministers (Blum in December 1946, and Ramadier in January 1947) and, with the constitution ratified, a Socialist president (Auriol). Despite these concessions, within a year the Party would find itself more isolated than ever, out of government and backing a fierce wave of strikes that shook, but did not topple, the new regime.
The PCF’s displacement from the seat of government to the political ‘ghetto’, where it would remain through (and beyond) the remaining life of the Fourth Republic, was played out in five main locations: the scenes of armed colonial conflict in Madagascar and Indochina; the shopfloor of Renault’s Boulogne-Billancourt works; the heart of political Paris, the Chamber and the Council of Ministers; the founding conference of the Cominform at Sklarska-Poreba, in Poland; and finally, in November-December 1947, across the whole of urban and industrial France.
Colonial conflicts, analysed in this book by Martin Shipway, undermined the Communists’ position in the Ramadier government from the moment it took office on 22 January 1947. War had broken out in Indochina a month earlier; it was a Communist Defence Minister, François Billoux, who was now responsible, at least nominally, for the armies fighting Ho Chi-Minh’s Communist-dominated nationalist movement.[385]By the early spring of 1947 the PCF was mobilising public opposition within France to the war; Billoux refused to stand up in the Chamber in homage to France’s troops fighting there; and when Ramadier sought a vote of confidence on his Indochina policy on 22 March, he was supported by the PCF’s ministers, but not by its other Deputies, who abstained. A week later an insurrection broke out in Madagascar its savage repression led the PCF ministers to walk out of the Council of Ministers on 16 April.
But it was wages policy that provoked the final break. Whatever the benefits of some policy initiatives backed by the PCF – the greater security enjoyed by public-sector workers after nationalisations, and the foundation of France’s welfare state – the PCF’s support for wage restraint alienated workers. That was already visible in the slow rate of party membership renewals that spring, as well as in the CGT’s disappointing results in elections to governing bodies of the social security system.[386]A strike over wages at Renault, organised by a small Trotskyist group from 25 April, left the CGT, after four days, with little choice but to join in. And when Ramadier, by now resolved to force the issue, asked for a vote of confidence over wages policy on 4 May, all of the Communist Deputies, including the ministers, voted against the government of which they were a part. It is likely that they expected Ramadier to resign; in the ensuing negotiations to form a government, they could demonstrate the impossibility of ruling the country without Communist co-operation. Instead, Ramadier found non-Communist replacements for the PCF ministers, and carried on governing with the support of Socialists, MRP and Radicals.[387]
With the dismissal of Thorez and his colleagues on 5 May 1947, the PCF was out of office and friendless: Stalin’s strategy of November 1944 had clearly failed. The PCF leaders, however, went on trying to implement it for five more months. On the international scene, the PCF evoked the ‘division of the world into two blocs’, but as a danger to be avoided rather than a fait accompli – even if the summer saw increasingly hostile statements towards ‘American imperialism’, especially after the Soviets had finally withdrawn from negotiations over the Marshall Plan, as well as (unsubstantiated) claims that the Americans had engineered the Party’s removal from government. In domestic politics, the Communists now did nothing to restrain outbreaks of industrial unrest; the aim was to prove how necessary their participation in government was. Thus, the emphasis at the Eleventh Congress, held from 25 to 29 June, remained the PCF’s status as a ‘party of government’ and the need to bring the Socialists (if not the MRP) back to a left-wing alliance. Even on 22 September, Thorez was still calling for the PCF’s return to office within a ‘government of democratic union’.[388]
Just as L’Humanité was carrying Thorez’s message to thousands of Communist readers, Duclos was gathering with leading figures from the Italian and East European Communist parties in Sklarska-Poreba. What they heard from the Soviet Politburo member Andreï Zhdanov could leave them in no doubt that Moscow’s line had changed radically. The world, said Zhdanov, was now divided into ‘two camps’ – the ‘imperialist and anti-democratic’ camp aimed at the ‘world domination of American imperialism’, and the ‘anti-imperialist and democratic’ camp, led by the Soviet Union, which sought the ‘undermining of imperialism, the consolidation of democracy and the eradication of the remnants of fascism’. Particularly dangerous in this confrontation was the ‘treacherous policy of right-wing Socialists like Blum in France, Attlee and Bevin in England, Schumacher in Germany’, who, as the imperialists’ ‘faithful accomplices’, were ‘sowing dissension in the ranks of the working class and poisoning its mind’.[389]It followed that alliances with such traitors, as practised until May by the French and Italian parties, were a crass error. The French and Italian comrades now stood accused of legalism, opportunism, and parliamentarianism, as well as a soft line towards the Marshall Plan, and were forced to make a thoroughgoing self-criticism before going home.
The PCF digested the Zhdanov line within a month. Thorez reproduced it at length in his report to the Central Committee on 29 October, regretting the Party’s ‘slowness’ in analysing the new international situation. No longer were the SFIO and MRP placed, as a year earlier, in the ‘democratic’ camp: now all non-Communist forces, from Socialists to Gaullists, belonged to the American party’.[390]The new line was translated into action in France’s workplaces and streets, on the back of rising working-class discontent resulting from falling living standards. Now the PCF proposed to lead industrial action, through its CGT majority, and to add political demands to wage claims. On 12 November the CGT’s Central Committee linked a virulent attack on the Marshall Plan (henceforth an ‘attempt by warmongering American capitalists to enslave Europe’)[391]to calls for strikes in support of a 25 per cent wage rise. The strike wave that gripped France for the next four weeks involved some 2.5 million workers and an exceptional level of violence. Marseilles and other southern towns fell, albeit briefly, into a state of quasi-insurrection; CGT militants derailed the Paris-Lille express with the loss of sixteen lives. The Ramadier government fell on 22 November. But its successor, headed by Robert Schuman, held firm; the Socialist Interior Minister Jules Moch proved ferocious in his use of police and armed forces against strikers, adding further poison to his party’s now execrable relations with the PCF; the moderates in the CGT drifted back to work after three weeks; and the strike formally ended on 10 December. The PCF had made a significant demonstration of force; but it ended the year more isolated than ever, with the CGT now split by the defection of its moderates to form a new union, Force Ouvrière. In conventional political terms, the policy pursued since the Liberation was in tatters. But the autumn U-turn had returned the Party to Moscow’s good graces. A meeting with Stalin in Moscow on 18 November – three years almost to the day since their conversation of 1944 – confirmed Thorez as the leader who would take the PCF into its long crossing of the Fourth Republic desert.[392]
A conventional political party in a democratic system faces continual and difficult choices between ‘policy, office, or votes’.[393]Office is attractive to party leaders for the opportunities it offers to achieve policy goals, as well as for party patronage and personal advantage.[394]But the realisation of policy goals is always subject to constraints, whether political (for example, in relation to coalition partners) or economic and financial. In the long run, to dilute or sacrifice policy goals in the face of constraints simply to remain in office may lose votes, temporarily or permanently; a spell out of office may serve to revitalise a party (through the revision or reaffirmation of policies) and win back electoral support.
The PCF’s record in the Liberation era can be analysed from this perspective, On the one hand, it was inevitable that a party openly committed to the transformation of French society in the interests of the working class would have difficulty keeping working-class support indefinitely when governing at a time of great economic hardship. In that sense, the PCF’s departure from government in May 1947 was decided at Billancourt rather than Washington or Moscow. At the same time, the PCF drew important benefits from its time in office. Building on its Resistance record, it established a status – not held hitherto – as a party of government. It claimed credit for major policy achievements: many of the social transformations of the Liberation era, outlined in this book by Herrick Chapman, owed something to the activities of Communist activists, Deputies, and ministers, and earned the party a durable capital of goodwill among workers. The new nationalised industries became strongholds of CGT and PCF activists; local elections – despite setbacks in October 1947 – gave the party a network of municipalities, especially in the suburbs of major cities; both lasted for decades. The PCF’s roots within French society, even at the dawn of the twenty-first century, owed much to the Liberation era.[395]
But the PCF was not a conventional left-wing party; it was defined by its relationship to Moscow. This had two consequences. First, as is clear from the Soviet archives, it took orders from the Kremlin. These orders did not coincide with the party’s spontaneous preferences; several weeks might be required to assimilate them; but obedience always prevailed. In 1944– 45, the PCF aspired to a strategy of confrontation and even revolution; Stalin, through Thorez, made it behave like a conventional party. In 1947–48 the PCF leadership, at least, had grown rather attached to their mainstream status; Moscow obliged them to undertake ‘mass actions’ (especially political strikes). Secondly, the Soviet link, and the suspicions it provoked among non-Communists, inevitably shaped the PCF’s position in the French political system. Even with the wartime alliance surviving – uneasily – on the world stage, and the tripartite PCF – SFIO– MRP coalition governing France, the Soviet link, more than anything else, disqualified the leader of France’s largest party from the premiership, on three separate occasions. And as the world slipped into Cold War it ensured that the PCF’s exclusion from office, far from being the brief absence hoped for by Thorez, would last thirty-four years.
Наумова Н. Н
«Независимые» на пути к власти (1944–1951 гг.)[396]
«Независимые», или традиционные правые – это различные группировки умеренных, возникшие в освобожденной Франции на обломках некогда всесильных, а после Второй мировой войны переживавших упадок и политическое угасание довоенных правоцентристских либеральных объединений Демократический Альянс (ДА) и Республиканская Федерация (РФ). «Независимыми» их стали называть во второй половине 40-х годов, когда в движении умеренных начала выделяться группа «независимых республиканцев», вокруг которой в 1948 г. произошло объединение части традиционных правых в партию Национальный Центр Независимых. В 1951 г. на ее основе возник Национальный Центр независимых и крестьян (СНИП) – крупнейшее правоцентристское объединение Четвертой Республики, включавшее в себя всех представителей лагеря умеренных.
Сразу же по окончании войны слабые, малочисленные традиционные правые, не способные выдвинуть яркие лозунги реформирования и обновления общества, казалось, были обречены на жалкое существование и политическую гибель. Однако уже через шесть лет после Освобождения «независимые», учредив СНИП, стали играть ведущую роль в складывавшейся правоцентристской коалиции (1951–1955 гг.), а их лидеры – А. Пинэ, Ж. Ланьель, Р. Коти – в результате всеобщих выборов 1951 г. получили высокие государственные посты.
В центре настоящего исследования – проблема возвращения к власти традиционных правых («независимых»). Главную свою цель автор видит в выявлении и объяснении тех причин и обстоятельств, которые помогли умеренным группировкам, полностью дискредитированным в глазах французов во время войны, вновь встать во главе Франции и возродить свои идейно-политические ценности.
Хронологические рамки исследования охватывают период с момента освобождения французской территории в 1944 г. до складывания в 1951 г. правоцентристского блока во главе с «независимыми», в том же году пришедшего к власти.
История умеренных, или «независимых» достаточно хорошо изучена во французской историографии[397]. В работах же советских историков о них обычно писали в уничижительном тоне как о «консервативных» и «реакционных» формированиях, сохранивших в неприкосновенности «принципы экономического либерализма» довоенных умеренных[398]. И лишь в последние годы в отечественной науке появился ряд публикаций, в которых предпринята попытка дать более объективную оценку движению «независимых», изучить историю отдельных партий, вошедших в СНИП, проанализировать деятельность его известных лидеров (А. Пине, Ж. Ланьеля)[399]. Представляется интересным и необходимым исследовать еще и такой аспект истории «независимых», как возвращение традиционных правых к власти в годы Четвертой Республики.
В освобожденной Франции, жаждавшей политических перемен и широких социально-экономических реформ, к власти пришло правительство трехпартийной коалиции, включавшей в себя ФКП, социалистическую партию (СФИО) и Народно-республиканское движение (МРП). Следуя основным положениям программы Национального Совета Сопротивления, коалиция и глава Временного режима генерал Ш. де Голль намеревались наказать вишистских преступников и их сообщников, национализировать крупные предприятия, банки и некоторые отрасли промышленности, ввести широкую систему социального обеспечения, демократизировать политический строй[400]. Страна жила ощущением скорых перемен, желанием активно участвовать в их проведении, строить новое общество, не оглядываясь назад в то уже далекое довоенное прошлое, которое являлось «золотым веком» умеренных.
Вторая мировая война резко изменила положение умеренных. Многие из них поддержали сотрудничавший с оккупантами режим Виши и его главу – маршала Петэна. Практически все депутаты РФ и многие лидеры ДА проголосовали 10 июля 1940 г. за предоставление всей полноты власти Петэну, а потом некоторые из них вошли в его правительство, например, руководитель ДА П.Э. Фланден. Те умеренные, которые отказались поддерживать Виши, были немногочисленны и, хотя их представители – А. Мюттер от РФ и Ж. Ланьель от ДА – даже входили в Национальный Совет Сопротивления, участие традиционных правых в движении Сопротивления оказалось незначительным.
В результате, после освобождения страны умеренные оказались в полной растерянности: их позиции были серьезно поколеблены сотрудничеством с правительством Виши, партийные структуры распались, многие известные лидеры подверглись судебному преследованию за пособничество оккупантам. В глазах общественного мнения умеренные выглядели главными виновниками поражения Франции летом 1940 г. и вынуждены были нести ответственность за участие в правительстве Виши и за неучастие в движении Сопротивления. По словам известного французского политолога Р. Ремона, в 1945 г. они были «отвергнуты избирателями, покинуты своими бывшими сторонниками, оттеснены от власти; казалось, им больше нечего ждать от будущего»[401]. Произошла серьезная дискредитация идейно-политических основ правоцентристских партий: их идеалов, политической традиции, идейных установок. Умеренные попытались интегрироваться в изменившуюся и пугающую своим «радикализмом» действительность. Но рассчитывать на поддержку избирателей в послевоенной Франции могли лишь те партии, которые открыто высказывались за перемены. Умеренные же оказались неспособны адаптироваться к условиям нового морально-психологического и политического климата. Все их усилия воссоздать или, может быть, объединить ДА и РФ не дали желаемых результатов[402]. Таким образом, на правом фланге партийно-политической сцены Франции образовался некий политический вакуум: быть правым считалось немодным, если не позорным.
[374] Pravda, 3 June 1946.
[375] Pravda, 6 June 1946.
[376] Izvestia, 19 June 1946.
[377] Pravda, 20 June 1946
[378] Pravda, 16 June 1946.
[379] The following account is taken from RSASPH, 82/2/1353, pp. 64-9. A French translation may be found in Communisme 35-7 (1994).
[380] Cf. Chapters 2 and 3.
[381] Pravda, 9 October 1946.
[382] Pravda, 9 October 1946.
[383] Pravda, 13 October 1946
[384] Pravda, 16 October 1946.
[385] Ramadier, unlike de Gaulle, had allowed a Communist into the Defence Ministry – but not before creating a separate ministry under him for each of the three armed services: these were headed by non-Communists.
[386] Buton, Les Lendemains, pp. 295–302; Courtois and Lazar, Histoire du PCF, p. 259.
[387] The best account of this episode remains G. Elgey, La République des illusions, 1945–1951 (Paris: Fayard, 1965), pp. 288–291.
[388] Courtois and Lazar, Histoire du PCF, pp. 260–262; Robrieux, Histoire intérieure du Parti communiste, Vol. п, pp. 198–204.
[389] Royal Institute of International Affairs, Documents on International Affairs, 1947–1948 (London: RIIA, 1952), pp. 122–146.
[390] Courtois and Lazar, Histoire du PCF, p. 278. For a contemporary reaction, cf. Duff Cooper to Ernest Bevin, 13 November 1947, NA/FO/371/67683; Duff Cooper, Britain’s ambassador to Paris, viewed the speech as a ‘complete reversal’ of policy imposed by Zhdanov.
[391] V. Lorwin, The French Labor Movement (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1954), pp. 119–120.
[392] Courtois and Lazar, Histoire du PCF, p. 282.
[393] W. Müller and K. Strøm (eds), Policy, Office or Votes? How Political Parties in Western Europe Make Hard Decisions (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1999).
[394] The top PCF leadership also enjoyed a particularly lavish lifestyle in the Liberation years: cf. Robrieux, Histoire intérieure du Parti communiste, Vol. II, pp. 154-7.
[395] Cf. M.-C. Lavabre and F. Platone, Que reste-t-il du PCF? (Paris: CEVIPOF/Autrement, 2003).
[396] Впервые опубликовано: Наумова Н. Н. «Независимые» на пути к власти (1944–1951 гг.) // Французский ежегодник 2003. М., 2003. С. 197–213.
[397] Merle M. Les modérés // Partis politiques et classes sociales en France. P., 1955; Rémond R. La droite en France de la Prèmiere Restauration à la V République. P., 1968; Guillaume S. A. Pinay, ou la confiance en politique. P., 1984; Histoire des droites en France. P., 1992.
[398] См., например: Молчанов Н.Н. Четвертая республика. М., 1963; Рубинский Ю.И. За колоннами Бурбонского дворца. М., 1967; Чернега В.Н. Буржуазные партии в политической системе Франции. Третья – Пятая Республики. М., 1987. С. 77.
[399] Малороссиянова О.А., Наумова Н.Н. «Независимые» в годы Четвертой Республики во Франции (1946–1958) // Вестник МГУ. Сер. 8 История. 1996. № 2; Они же. Эксперимент Пинэ (1952) // Французский либерализм в прошлом и настоящем. М., 2001; Наумова Н.Н. Французский либерализм в первой половине XX века //Там же.
[400] Подробнее см.: Наринский М.М. Борьба классов и партий во Франции 1944–1958. М., 1983; Смирнов В.П. Франция в XX веке. М., 2001.
[401] Rémond R. Op. cit. Vol. 2. P. 239.
[402] Подробнее см.: Histoire des droites en France… P. 342–343.